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Islamic world order using jihadist Islamic terrorism as a tactic to achieve that end. This paper presents an examination of and proposal for the formulation and implementation of a grand strategy for the 21 st century.
In examining U.S. strategic objectives in going to war in Iraq, the paper illustrates how policies led inadvertently to a strategic construct that holds the potential for the formulation of a new grand strategy -a strategy of integration. The purpose is to expand upon the eventual justification for going to war and explore the validity, implications, and possible means of application of a new strategic security paradigm. The assessment suggests that a war of cooption entails a fundamental paradox that must be addressed through the exercise of cultural intelligence and the analysis and manipulation of cultural control measures appropriate to the cultural milieu, which is an integral element of a grand strategy for the 21 st century -a strategy of integration.
FROM CONTAINMENT TO INTEGRATION: A GRAND STRATEGY FOR THE 21
ST CENTURY
The latter half of the twentieth century was shaped by the U.S. grand strategy of containment as America and her allies waged a global campaign to limit communist expansion fostered by the Soviet Union. Just as containment was the grand strategic response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union to U.S. security, values, and influence in the second half of the 20 th century, an innovative approach is again needed in response to the threat posed by radical
Islamists who seek to replace the U.S.-led secular, democratic, global system with an Islamic world order using jihadist Islamic terrorism as a tactic to achieve that end. This paper presents an examination of and proposal for the formulation and implementation of a grand strategy for the 21 st century.
I begin with the thesis that, as an element of the Global War on Terrorism, Operation
Iraqi Freedom constitutes a new type of war -a war of co-option. Examining U.S. strategic objectives in going to war in Iraq, the paper illustrates how maneuvering to justify the war in the absence of evidence of weapons of mass destruction resulted in policies that led inadvertently to a strategic construct that holds the potential for the formulation of a new grand strategy -a strategy of integration. This paper neither defends nor criticizes the decision to go to war in Iraq. 1 Its purpose is to expand upon the eventual justification for going to war and explore the validity, implications, and possible means of application of a new strategic security paradigm.
The assessment suggests that while a war of co-option can be an element in a strategy of integration, it entails a fundamental paradox that must be addressed through the exercise of cultural intelligence and the analysis and manipulation of cultural control measures appropriate to the cultural milieu, which is an integral element of a grand strategy for the 21 st century -a strategy of integration.
By integration, I mean a strategy that focuses all elements of national power towards the objective of motivating nations, groups, cultures, and even individuals, to adopt and internalize U.S. values or to view the support of U.S. objectives as being in their own interest. A grand strategy of inclusion is attractive in that it is fundamentally non-kinetic, and reduces points of cultural and ideological friction while increasing the number of nations that participate in the U.S.
led global network of democratic economies. It also entails political and social engineering on a grand scale, the objective of which is nothing less than the transformation of a society into a functioning democracy that buys into and internalizes democratic values. We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties, and then systemically break them. If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long…. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge…. And our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives. the United States has adopted a new policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East. This strategy requires the same persistence and energy and idealism we have shown before. And it will yield the same results. As in Europe, as in Asia, as in every region of the world, the advance of freedom leads to peace. The advance of freedom is the calling of our time; it is the calling of our country. It is impossible to kill all terrorists, but creating for the people of the Middle East the benefits of a democratic society could result in an end to terrorism at its source. We were not going to war to conquer Iraq, we were going to war to depose its leadership and create for the Iraqi people a society in which they would reap the benefits of living in a democracy with all the rights and opportunities that entails. As a force for good, America would co-opt the Iraqi people and create a model democracy in the heart of the Arab world. Integrating Iraq into the global community of democratic nations was the first step in a strategy to spread democracy throughout the region.
In a certain sense, the very concept of initiating such a plan by prosecuting a war of co-option is inherently paradoxical, though not in the sense used by Luttwak. 16 Fighting a war of co-option, as in Iraq, means conducting military operations to defeat a nation's military and depose its leadership with the expectation that such action will set the conditions for the populace to adopt the attacker's social and political value system. There is, however, great value in a strategy that focuses on "diminish[ing] the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit" 17 Decision makers and policy planners must recognize that our forces and our nation are operating in a "theater" of war in which military operations should play a less significant role.
Conflict is no longer industrial, it is political-cultural and the United States finds itself operating in a "theater" of produced by 24 hour news programming, satellite, and internet communications. The conflict is conducted as much in the media as on the battlefield -a point well understood by our adversaries. In his June 2005 letter, Ayman al-Zawahiri writes I say to you: that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma. 22 Performance violence such as beheadings and suicide bombings are played out on CNN and al Jazeera with the strategic goals of weakening the resolve of U.S. allies and the U.S.
public while mobilizing elements of the Islamic world to garner funding, recruits, prominence and to promote anti-American and anti-western sentiment. Meanwhile, in western capitols, social and political considerations direct military decisions. In such an environment, cross cultural friction or misunderstanding can result in tactical, operational, and strategic failure.
Operating in a "theater" of war is often referred to as a battle for hearts and minds.
This is a misunderstanding of the nature of the struggle. The battle is "of" hearts and minds, rather than '"for" hearts and minds. In the minds of administration planners, our democratic values rest upon inalienable rights . Respect for these rights is advantageous to both individuals and society as a whole. Were we in the situation of the Iraqi people under Saddam -living under the thumb of a despot, susceptible to his every whim, living in fear of the midnight knock on the door -we would welcome with open arms those who would liberate us and extend to us the opportunities and benefits of a democratic way of life. This is a reasonable, logical argument -an appeal to the mind.
Our adversaries , such as al Qaeda, understand the culture and emotional mindset of the people. They speak to them in the language and poetic style of the Koran; they hearken back to The error made by the Bush administration was not in choosing, consciously or not, a strategy of integration, but in attempting to achieve it via a war of co-option and to execute it under assumptions based on mirror imaging. As Americans we are culturally programmed to respond positively to western, democratic values and ideals. Iraqis are not Americans -their culture, value system, and world view are shaped, not by a Judeo-Christian, west European, democratic milieu, but by an Arab-Bedouin, Muslim, patriarchal, tribal-based society and history.
In a battle of hearts and minds, we must be able to identify those for whom an appeal to the mind will be effective -a strategy of targeted integration. If the security threat to the U.S. is posed by radical, jihadist Islamists, then a first step is to identify and then target for influence those moderate Arabs and Muslims who are willing to accommodate modernism and globalism.
The objective is not to defeat or supplant Islam, nor is it to convert its adherents. In response to globalization and modernity, Islam in the main is in the early stages of a reformation. A grand strategy of integration would focus efforts on setting the conditions to enhance the process. In the earliest stages, the strategy should focus on those already receptive to the message such as the political leadership and educated middle class of Jordan; educated middle class Palestinian expatriates; and the political leadership and educated class of Tunisia. and anticipate how actions will be perceived by the target populace, how that population will likely act in a given situation, and perhaps more importantly, how our actions can effect local behavior and exercise control.
Culture must be treated as the key strategic and operating environment and diplomats, soldiers, and leaders need the information required to operate within that environment. A detailed and, if possible standardized, cultural analysis is needed to serve as the foundation for constructing a plan of action for transforming the target culture and society.
As Kotter has noted, "culture is not something that you manipulate easily….Culture changes only after you have successfully altered people's actions, after the new behavior produces some group benefit for a period of time, and after people see the connection between the new actions and the performance improvement." 27 An analytical framework, such as the model I present below, is required to provide the cultural understanding and information necessary to formulate and put into effect plans and operations that will motivate a target population to alter its actions and beliefs.
Social science can provide a framework for identifyi ng and understanding cultural control measures, and provide the planner with the ability to design means to manipulate actions which, in turn, can eventually transform societal norms. Whether operating tactically or planning strategically in support of national security goals, soldiers and leaders need to understand how actions will be perceived and how the perceptions and actions of the local populace can be influenced in support of U.S. interests. As stated above, culture informs perception and motivates action.
Following is an example of a standardized analytical scheme that focuses on cultural control measures. 28 The scheme is a modification of a method developed by Richard
Cottam to explore the impact of nationalism on state capabilities. 29 Cottam's work in turn builds on the work of Amitai Etzioni in assessing control in complex organizations. 30 The cultural control measures to be addressed are coercion, utilitarian, normative habitual and normative active measures.
Coercion refers to the use or threat of force to compel compliance. The utilitarian control measure focuses on meeting the needs and, to a degree, the desires of a given group. The final two control measures are more difficult to grasp as they possess a strong symbolic component. The importance of symbols and symbolism in understanding and motivating a people cannot be underestimated. As Mary Jo Hatch has noted, "humans can engage in the socially constructed aspects of organizational life because they make, use, and interpret symbols and because they are sensitive to the interpretations made by others." There is potential for great benefit along the entire tactical-operational-strategic spectrum in utilizing a cultural control measure analytical framework as a means of producing cultural awareness and intelligence to enhance the effectiveness of national policy. However, there is also a danger that poor or incomplete analysis will either misinterpret information or miss something entirely. For this reason, it is not appropriate for any single agency or organization, such as the military, to be responsible for the conduct of cultural control measures analysis. Nor, as some have argued, is it appropriate to have "redundant analytic capabilities in our intelligence community" with "competing organizations that report to different bosses in the federal government". 33 At a time when all instruments of national power must be synchronized to achieve national security objectives As the representatives of these cells will come from multiple agencies, they should be created and managed under the control and direction of the Director of National
Intelligence, with each cell conducting analysis and providing products tailored to users at all levels -tactical, operational, and strategic -across the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power (DIME). It is, however, obviously unrealistic to create permanent, standing red cells for all cultures on earth. It is, therefore, advisable to identify those cultures with which we are currently or most likely to come into contact, either as adversaries or as allies and coalition partners. 35 There is also value in creating generic cells to cover over-arching cultures such as "Arab" or " birth rates and child mortality; improve health, nutrition, and education; stem the spread of HIV/AIDS; build robust and self-sustaining community organizations; and encourage grassroots democracy." 37 It must be an explicit tenet of a grand strategy on integration that the U.S. does not seek to achieve cultural assimilation -a message that must be intertwined in all manners of engagement. It is also imperative that the U.S. understand and accept that democracies that develop in the greater Middle East and elsewhere will not be democracies that Thomas
Jefferson would necessarily recognize, and that is ok. When peoples take possession of democratic ideals, they will make them uniquely their own. A strategy of integration should strive to foster not just the adoption of democratic values, but a melding of democratic values with existing cultural norms.
Summary
Conflict is now political-cultural and played out in a "theater" of war. In the post 9/11 world, it is no use talking about "solutions", which is a mechanical concept. We must turn to trend creation, a long term concept which requires a grand strategy to affect. A grand strategy of integration is at its core non-kinetic. This is not to suggest that the military element of power will cease to be relevant. Far from it, as the recent war in Iraq illustrates. Operation Iraqi
Freedom should be understood as a war of co-option, undertaken to create an Iraq that is an "inclusive democratic state" which is "in our own national interest". 38 However, if properly executed, a strategy of integration will serve to identify high value targets by culture that are primarily symbolic as opposed to solely physical. The intent of integration, which is to manipulate attitudes and inculcate values that lead to democratization and inclusion in a global economy, is a strategy to obviate the need for kinetic operations in the long term, while in the short term guiding counter-insurgency campaigns. A grand strategy of integration thus puts war in context as an element (hopefully an element of last resort) of national power, rather than an end in itself.
A strategy of integration will require not only the acquiescence of the target population, but the long-term support of the American public and the buy in of America's allies and coalition partners. Strategic thinkers and planners will have to craft their strategy for the long term, targeting various audiences of differing cultural motivations and world views. To attempt such an ambitious endeavor, a grand strategy of integration requires a dynamic, culturally specific multi-agency campaign plan and is critically dependent upon the coordinated application of all elements of national power. The military cannot operate in a vacuum, absent the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of power. In the current political-cultural environment, it is a mistake to focus solely on the actions of the military on the ground, and it is a waste of resources to maintain redundant but disconnected analytic capabilities in our intelligence community. The creation of cultural red cells focused on conducting cultural control measures analysis is a means to provide the planners, operators, and decision makers at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels with the tools and information needed to be culturally adept.
The grand strategy of containment guided U.S. policy and engagement towards the USSR while maintaining global relevance for 40 years. A grand strategy of integration will likely take at least a generation or two to effect the cultural adaptation necessary to serve as midwife to an Islamic reformation as a means of combating jihadist terrorism, while providing the global scope to bring about the democratic transformation necessary to integrate developing countries into the modern, global economy. As a grand strategy, integration is suitable as its focus is the transformation of societies into functioning democracies that share our values, enhancing U.S.
national security. A grand strategy of integration is feasible as it does not require the commitment of additional resources, but focuses on a reorganization of existing intelligence resources to better support and coordinate the formulation of policy and the ongoing engagement efforts of all elements of national power. A grand strategy of integration is acceptable both from a self-interest perspective, as it serves the goal of enhancing and securing U.S. security; and from a moral perspective as it enhances the security and quality of life of the populations of developing and emergent nations without requiring them to pay the unacceptable price of cultural assimilation.
Endnotes
28 While many will be uncomfortable with the word 'control", I do not see this as a serious issue. The term "control system" is one used in the social science literature. More importantly is an understanding of what is meant by the term. While individuals possess free will and the ability to act as they choose, cultural mores and values frame how a people perceive the worldwhat is right and wrong, what is good or bad; which inform the norms that establish behavior based on values and perceptions in a given situation. The culture also establishes methods for dealing with those that refuse to conform their behavior to the culturally established norms, ranging from censure or ostracization to death. In a real sense, culture acts to "control" the behavior of the members of that culture. To effect integration, the U.S. must effectively use all instruments of national power to manipulate the target, be it a nation, a culture, or a political leader, to adopt and support U.S. values. This requires a detailed understanding of how best to craft the message, what actions will result in the desired reactions -in effect, which buttons to push, when, and how. The understanding of cultural control measures serves to enhance the process of inclusion while minimizing or even avoiding culture shock during the process. 29 
